![]() ![]() Perhaps the biggest challenge to realizing dynamic maritime sustainment is the lack of ready-to-issue logistics sustainment to support the distributed stand-in force units at the point of need. These efforts all serve as part of a larger naval campaign intended to help deter or influence an adversary’s decision calculus - logistics as deterrence. ![]() These operational concepts are a form of expeditionary warfare that involve the employment of rapid, mobile, low-signature naval expeditionary forces in austere and temporary locations ashore or inshore within contested maritime environments for the purpose of conducting sea denial and reconnaissance. Specifically, dynamic maritime sustainment calls for a fresh logistics concept for the naval fleet to effectively integrate distributed maritime operations, littoral operations in a contested environment, and expeditionary advanced basing operations while simultaneously sustaining the remainder of the fleet. This concept would bring together the Marine Corps and Navy in utilizing existing capabilities and expanding the network to include partner nations like Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore. To realize this goal, we propose a new concept: dynamic maritime sustainment. Global positioning would expand relationships with allies and partners to place equipment and supplies ashore and afloat, and drastically reduce the force closure window. This model places a tremendous amount of stress on strategic lift platforms during a crisis when the joint force collectively will require these assets to position strategic deterrence capabilities. Currently, most of the equipment and supplies needed to support operating forces are either co-located at the home station of the unit or afloat on a prepositioned vessel. This means rethinking how equipment and supplies are positioned to support operating forces and incorporating the air, land, and maritime domains. In response, Washington should embrace global positioning to achieve logistics endurance that will better sustain forces in a highly distributed and undeveloped theater. As a result, forward-deployed forces both ashore and afloat, as well as extended lines of communication in the air and sea, will be increasingly vulnerable. movement, ranging from missile defense systems radiating into the air domain to degradation and disruption of sea lines of communication through a naval blockade under the guise of an integrated naval exercise. ![]() The People’s Republic of China has a number of options to contest U.S. How are the United States and partner nations preparing for this potential scenario? The United States can no longer count on primacy in all warfighting domains during a near-peer conflict, making freedom of movement increasingly challenging. Marine Corps’ stand-in forces, as well as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, currently distributed around several key areas for training and counter-reconnaissance missions, have been left to sustain themselves for an undetermined amount of time. As tensions continued to escalate in the area, Pacific Fleet ordered all Navy ships to pull back to avoid any miscalculation. and Japanese training exercises had leadership in Taiwan nervous about what this meant for defense of their sovereignty. ![]() marines and Japanese soldiers headed towards the target area while helicopters conducted reconnaissance and raids on key terrain. Navy ships launched over two dozen amphibious assault vehicles and assault boats carrying U.S. Concurrently, as part of exercise STEEL DRAGON, U.S. A total of six Luyang III destroyers also participated, launching multiple surface-to-air missiles to demonstrate their capacity for fire support. The People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps launched an unannounced brigade-level landing exercise near Taiwan, in order to practice amphibious landings. Headquarters Pacific Fleet just sent out an alert after recent days of observing a few Chinese Type 075 amphibious assault ships amassing in the China Sea. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |